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NOTES
Purity and Utility: Diversity of Interest in River Pollution
It has recently been said that "the American people must destroy water
pollution or it will destroy us." 1 While one may indulge the hope that such
a ringing challenge will prove effective as a battle-cry, yet until one or the
other of these all-decisive alternatives is forthcoming, it seems safe to
predict that the fate of the nation's streams and of the people's interests
therein will continue to hang by the more or less firm thread of judicial
decision, under the same body of law that governed when Pepys and his
neighbor complained of the dumping of garbage in the Thames. In the
succeeding two and a half centuries the clashing demands of an industrial
and metropolitan civilization have made the problem of river pollution, in
both its legal and economic aspects, increasingly more complex. But even
this interplay of opposing interests in utilizing the full advantages of flowing
water has long since lost its novelty; these interests have increased rather
in number and extent than in kind since their creation
by the commencement
2
of industrial development and urban concentration.
Fraught with vital social concern, the legal problems arising out of the
fact that a great many persons are attempting to employ a limited amount
of water for an unlimited number of purposes constantly compel the
judiciary to adapt established principles of law to the shifting economic
scene.3 Accordingly, in this field of the law perhaps more than in any other,
it is not always proper to conclude, simply because one court approves a
certain form of conduct and another court in a different locality, while
recognizing the same rule of law, forbids similar conduct, that therefore
one court is right and the other wrong. It may well be justifiable, for
instance, for one court to enjoin an upper riparian owner from fouling a
stream with house refuse in such a way as to make it unfit for a lower
proprietor to raise trout therein, 4 while another court refuses to enjoin the
drainage of water from gravel pits merely to enable a lower owner to grow
watercresses. 5 Again, it may be proper to restrain the pollution of a stream
forming a part of a city's water supply by the overflow from a duck pond, 6
while elsewhere circumstances prompt a holding that some pollution of a
i. Hon. Augustine Lonergan, United States Senator from Connecticut, Stream Pollution
in the United States, quoting Dr. Theobald Smith (radio address, Dec. 23, 1935).
2. "In the Cart are found perch, trout, flounders, and braises, or gilt-heads, but none of
them in any considerable quantities, owing, no doubt, in a great degree to the bleach-fields,
print-fields, and a copperas work upon the banks of the river. As for the fine large pearls
once found in this river, and which, according to our old historians, had been noticed by the
most eminent jewelers in Europe, they have long disappeared, and the river has become a
more certain source of wealth by its utility to an industrious and manufacturing neighbourhood." Statistical Account of Scotland relating to the Abbey Parish of Paisley (1793),
quoted in Taylor, The Law Affecting River Pollution (927) I ScoTs. L. T. 125.
3. Cf. Heilman, The CorrelationBetween the Sciences of Law and Economics (1932) 20
CALI F. L. REV. 379, 381.
4. Seaman v. Lee, io Hun 6o7 (N. Y. 1877).
5. Weeks v. Heward, io Week. Rep. 557 (Ch. 1862).
6. New York v. Blum, 208 N. Y. 237, ior N. E. 869 (1913), affrminzg 15I App. Div.
923, 135 N. Y. Supp. 11o4 (1912), modifying 72 N. Y. Misc. 243, -131 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1911).
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stream by the defendant's use of his pond for horses, cows, and geese is
within his right as being only a reasonable use.7 And such questions as
where lies "the dividing line between a reasonable and an unreasonable
quantity of slimes and tailings to discharge into the stream" may well prove
elusive for any court to answer.8
Fortunately, in the common-law doctrine of riparian rights the courts
have a conveniently flexible legal yardstick. While the water flowing in a
natural stream is not subject to ownership, 9 the owner of riparian land is
said to have a right to the continued flow of the stream without substantial
diminution in quantity or substantial alteration in quality, with a corresponding duty to refrain from interfering with the flow to more than a
reasonable extent. 10 In short, the riparian right is a qualified right, a right
to enjoy all uses of the stream that are not unreasonable in their effect on
other riparian owners. It is not a right to have the stream flow as it was
wont to flow, but only as it may from time to time be somewhat diminished
or polluted by another riparian owner's reasonable use.'
While some of the states of the Far West 12 have rejected the common-law doctrine of riparian rights in favor of the prior appropriation
rule, which rests on an utterly different conception, 13 curiously enough the
legal result in pollution cases-though not in cases of diversion or diminution-is approximately the same as that reached under the traditional
riparian right view. This is so because the right obtained by priority to a
continued taking of a quantity of water does not include the right to pollute
the unappropriated water left in the stream. 14 California has developed a
rather perplexing hybrid system combining both of the rival conceptions
aforementioned, with the common-law rule of riparian rights appearing to
predominate; 15 but in adjudicating the right to pollute or to be free from
7. McEvoy v. Taylor, 56 Wash. 357, 105 Pac. 851 (igo).
8. See Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, Inc., 44 P. (2d) 0l24, 1028 (Colo. 1935).
9. Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & Aid. i (K. B. 1833) ; 3 KENT, COMMENTAMIS *439.
Ia. See Dumont v. Kellog, 29 Mich. 42o, 424 (1874) ; Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353, 369

(1851); I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) 1131. A view that the Michigan cases
represent a third doctrine, that of "reasonable use", and that this is not the same as the
common-law rule of riparian rights, is expressed in Jacobson, Stream Pollution and Special
Interests (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 99, 105, but the distinction appears not well founded.
ii. See Holmes v. Nay, 186 Cal. 231, 235, 199 Pac. 325, 327 (1921); Merrifield v. Wor-

cester, i1O Mass. 216, 219 (1872) ; I FARNHAm, WATERS (1904) § 64; Wiel, Running Water
(I9o9) 22 HARv. L. REv. 190, 199. To the effect that this is a right incident to the ownership of riparian land and can not be granted to a non-riparian owner as a right in gross, see
Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 3 H. & C. 300 (Ex. 1864); Harvey Realty Co. v.
Borough of Wallingford, ini Conn. 352, 15o Atl. 6o (193o) ; cf. Doremus v. City of Paterson, 63 N. J. Eq. 6o5, 52 AtI. iloy (19o2). This proposition does not mean, however, that
pollution of a stream by a riparian owner may not invade a right of a non-riparian owner.
Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 84o, 146 So. 292 (1933) (non-riparian awarded damages for nuisance based on increased number of mosquitoes bred in creek due to pollution by
defendant).
12. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming. See
Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the California Law of Riparian. Rights, in RADiN
& KiDD, LEGAL ESSAYS IN TmUTE TO ORRIN Kip McMuRPA.Y (1935) 7, 8.
13. See Oppelander v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 142, 148, 31 Pac. 854, 856 (1892);
Wiel, Theories of Water Law (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 530.
14. Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 9
Colo. App. 407, 48 Pac. 828 (I897); Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, Inc., 44 P. (2d) 1024

(Colo. 1935).

I5. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 Pac. 919 (1884) ; Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal &
Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 Pac. 5o2 (igog). This situation has provoked considerable
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pollution the California courts are apparently moved by much the same
influences as are others.
In general, it would seem that such right expands or contracts, as a
matter of judicial practice, in response to the geographical and economic
environment, the identity of the parties before the court, and the interests
of the groups represented by them. A survey of the decisions warrants
their classification roughly into three groups, according as the predominant
interest involved is the industrial demand to pollute streams for the purpose
of disposing of mining and manufacturing refuse, the public interest of protecting the purity of the water supply, or the desire of municipalities to have
their sewage carried off by the rivers.
Where the parties to a suit are two manufacturers, two miners, a miner
and a manufacturer, or even one of these and a farmer, the interests are
usually much less clear-cut than in those cases wherein some out-and-out
It is not
public purpose is apt to make the weight of "utility" decisive.1
surprising, then, that it is in the former cases, where the parties stand on
an approximately even footing, that the courts are able to examine the legal
problem with an unclouded vision; and accordingly, the opinions written
in such cases are likely to state most accurately the factors that correctly
should be given consideration in determining the bounds of the right to
pollute.17 These factors are: the size, depth, and velocity of the stream,
the quantity and quality of the polluting material, the purpose for which
the defendant is polluting the stream, the distance between the plaintiff's
premises and the point where trle polluting material is discharged,18 and
the harmful effect on the plaintiff or, even where there is non-user, on the
water flowing by his land.1 9
But even in this class of cases, the judges not infrequently indulge a
preference for or against some particular interest or activity,20 and especially

rivalry among the legal writers championing each view. See Bingham, op. cit. supra note 12;
Grunsky, The Riparian Doctrine in California (1930) 4 CALIF. B. J. 178, 204; Treadwell,
Modernizing the Water Law (1928) 17 CALw. L. REv. I.
16. Cf. Jacobson, op. cit. supra note Io, at 122.
17. See Collins Mfg. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 14 F. (2d) 871 (D. C. Mass.
1926) ; Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N. E. 468 (197) ; Holsman v.
Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335 (Ch. 1862) ; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164
N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142 (19oo).
18. In Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142 (I9OO), mill owners one and
a half to thirty miles below the defendant's salt works were awarded injunctive relief.
ig. Under the traditional common-law theory, the question of the plaintiff's user or nonuser is not a factor to be considered, Mann v. Willey, 51 App. Div. 169, 64 N. Y. Supp. 589
(3d Dep't 19oo) ; for a lower riparian proprietor who is not using the water at all may acquire a right of action against an upper riparian for materially altering the quantity or quality of the stream, the theory being-though logicallyr unsupportable-that unless a right of
action is given to the lower owner, the upper may acquire a prescriptive right to diminish or
pollute the flow of water. See Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 86 Ala. 587, 6 So. 78 (1888) ;
Stanford v. Felt, 71 Cal. 249, 16 Pac. 9oo (1886) ; Bingham, op. cit. supra note 15, at I5.
However, what other riparian owners would ordinarily need for domestic purposes has bearing on the reasonableness of the defendant's user. Gillett v. Johnson, 30 Conn. i8o (1861);
Barrett v. Parsons, io Cush. 367 (Mass. 1852).
2o. See Carhart v. Auburn Gas Light Co., 22 Barb. 297, 3T2 (N. Y. 1856) ("gas works
are to be placed in the class of erections which are not within the ordinary and usual purposes to which real estate is applied") ; McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 38 N. D.
465, 483, 165 N. W. 504, 509 (1917) ("we are by no means satisfied that a riparian owner
within the limits of a city at a point [close] to residences and manufacturing establishments . . . can legally claim that the cutting of ice . . . is a reasonable use of the
waters in the stream").
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is this so where geographical circumstances have made the development of
some one natural resource the foundation of the community's economic
structure. Mining is certainly the most striking example of such an activity.
In California the early entrenchment of the pioneer gold prospectors who
were largely responsible for the settlement as well as the development of
that state found no one to resist the full satisfaction of their economic
demands. And the early decisions of the California Supreme Court seem
to have for their only purpose an adjustment between the claims of prior
and subsequent appropriators in view of the requirements of the hydraulic
process of mining, 21 without regard to the possible hardships imposed on
lower agriculturists by such methods. Very soon, however, the value of
fruit-growing became sufficient to merit protection from encroachments
by mining.22 And it was not long until the necessity for curtailing the
destructive results of the hydraulic process by injunction forced itself upon
the court. 23 Of recent years, it is interesting to note, the orange-growers
seem to be receiving at least the equal protection of24the law to which they
are entitled against injury by industrial operations.
The glaring example of an overbalancing of interests in favor of mining
is not to be found in California or the "prior appropriation" states, however,
but in Pennsylvania, under a curious stretching of the riparian right doctrine
whereby the coal mines have since 1886 enjoyed nearly complete liberty in
pouring their acidulated waters into the streams of the state. By its decision
in the now notorious case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,25 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has limited the application of the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas which is generally observed,2 6 in favor
of the proposition that harm caused to one landowner by another as the
necessary and unavoidable result of a natural use of his land by the latter,
without negligence or malice, is damnum absque iniuria. Though this
rule has been strictly limited to a "natural use" of the land 28 and, in stream
21. Bear River & A. Water & Mining Co. v. New York Mining Co., 8 Cal. 327 (1857) ;
Hill v. King, 8 Cal. 336 (1857) ; cf. Esmond v. Chew, 15 Cal. 137 (186o) ; Hill v. Smith, 27
Cal. 476 (1865).
22. Wixon v. Bear River & A. Water & Mining Co., 24 Cal. 367 (1864).
23. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 Pac. 1152 (1884) ; Eureka
Lake & Y. Canal Co. v. Superior Ct., 66 Cal. 311, 5 Pac. 490 (1885) ; McLaughlin v. Del Re,
71 Cal. 23o, 6 Pac. 881 (1886).
24. Cf. California Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 522, 195
Pac. 694 (1920).

25. 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886) (mine operator permitted to pollute stream to the
damage of plaintiff's country estate). Contra: Drake v. Lady Ensley Co., 1O2 Ala. 5o, 14
So. 749 (1894) ; Thomas v. Ohio Coal Co., igg Ill. App. 50 (1916) ; Straight v. Hover, 79
Ohio St. 263, 87 N. E. 174 (igog) ; and numerous other cases definitely repudiating the Pennsylvania view. See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (igio) 59 U. OF PA. L. REV.
298, 373, 388-389, n. 71; Note (924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 66, 68.
26. See Holmes v. Nay, 186 Cal. 231, 241, 199 Pac. 325, 330 (192i).

And previous

Pennsylvania decisions indicated that the necessities of one man's business were not to be
made the standard of another's rights. See Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298, 302 (1855) ;
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Miller, 112 Pa. 34, 41, 3 AtI. 780, 781 (1886); cf. Howell v. McCoy,
3 Rawle 256, 269 (1832).
27. The following cases applied the rule of the Sanderson case in related situations:
Harvey v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63, 5o Atl. 77o (i92) ; Alexander v. Wilkes-Barre
Coal Co., 254 Pa. 1, 98 AtI. 794 (ii6).
28. Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (i8gi) ; Hauck v. Pipe Line Co.,
153 Pa. 366, 26 Atl. 644 (1893) ; Conti v. New Castle Lime & Stone Co., 4 Pa. Super. 321

(1928).
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pollution cases, to the discharge of water by the natural drainage of the
land,29 it still gives a surprising privilege to coal mining and probably to
stone quarrying 30 and oil-producing 81 as well. Indeed, for a time it seemed
possible that even the public interest in protecting the water supply was to
be subordinated,3 2 but finally the Pennsylvania court came to the point of
expressly recognizing that the public health might be of more compelling
importance than the prosperity of a great industry, and it refused to extend
the special privilege given in the Sanderson Case to include any right to drain
polluted33 mine water into a natural stream to the injury of the public water
supply.

There can no longer be any doubt that the public drinking supply, in
its essential importance to the common welfare, dwarfs all other interests
in the use of flowing water. And everywhere this matter is hedged about
with a protective growth of statutes. 34 Yet statutory regulation in the
interest of the public health by no means disposes of all problems-it rather
tends to complicate them. For, while the state may under its police power
and by reasonable methods regulate and restrain certain uses of a stream in
the interest of the general welfare,3 5 yet it may not, under the federal 36
and most state constitutions,3 7 go so far as to deprive the landowner of the
38
enjoyment of his rights of private property without just compensation.
On the other hand, by condemnation and compensation under the power of
eminent domain, a state or its instrumentality may do what would not be
possible under its police power.3 9 It is not within the purpose of the present
note to discuss these questions of constitutional law, except to point out that
in general the courts are astute to uphold regulatory statutes and ordinances,
regarding the conservation of 4the
public water supply as being peculiarly
0
within the state's police power.

Parallel, though distinct, problems arise under legislative control of
municipal sewage, 4 ' the difference being that which lies between statutory
29. McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 Atl. i1o2 (1913).
30. See Conti v. New Castle Lime & Stone Co., 94 Pa. Super. 321 (1928).
31. See Hauck v. Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 Atl. 644 (1893).
32. Union Water Co. v. Enterprise Oil Co., 38 Pitts. L. J. I59 (0890) (refused to enjoin
oil producer from discharging salt water into stream used as drinking supply).
33. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 Atl. 386 (1924), cert.
denied, 267 U. S. 592 (925) ; see Commonwealth ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Russell, I72 Pa. 5o6,

509, 33 Atl. 709, 710 (1896).

34. E. g., ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 19, § 144 (W; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin,
1934) 99 841O-843i; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 35, 99 681-684 ("this act shall not
apply to any pollution or contamination caused by or resulting from water pumped or flowing
from coal mines or water used in the preparation of coal"); UTAH REV. STAT. (1933)
§ I5-8-I5.
35. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Co., 73 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 9th,
1934) ; cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (934).
36. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV, § i.
37. E. g., ILL. CoNsT. art. 11, § 13; MISSOURI CONsT. art. II, §§ 20, 21; UTAH CONST.
art. I, §§ 7, 22.
38. Irving's Ex'rs v. Media, 194 Pa. 648, 45 Atl. 482 (I9OO) ; Bountiful City v. De Luca,
77 Utah 107, 292 Pac. 194 (930).
39. See Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 124, 292 Pac. 194, 201 (1930).
40. State ex rel. Dep't of Health v. Chemical Co. of America, go N. J. Eq. 425, IO7 Atl.
164 (Ch. 1iP1) ; North Carolina State Board of Health v. Commissioners of Louisburg, 173
N. C. 250, 91 S. E. 1019 (1917); Commonwealth v. Emmers, 221 Pa. 299, 7o Atl. 762 (I9o8).
41. E. g., CONN. Gm. STAT. (930) c. 140; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 42, § 323;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) §§ 11534-11536, I1558-1I56I; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932)
C. 83; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 35, §§ 741-750.
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prohibition of the full exercise of a property right of private individuals
interfering with the public water supply and statutory authorization of a
more than full exercise of the property right to which a municipality would
be entitled as a riparian owner. 4- The riparian right to the reasonable use
of a stream is a right of private property,4 3 which may not be seized without
due process of law or under legislative enactment without compensation
being made. 4 4 This would seem to mean that not only can the riparian
owner's right to use the stream for reasonable purposes not be arbitrarily
taken away by a statute attempting to forbid all pollution of the water, but
neither can he be deprived (by any statutory authorization of the discharge
of sewage by a municipal
corporation) of his right to enjoy a reasonable
45
purity of the water.
While there is clearly a certain degree of utility in having a convenient
and relatively inexpensive method of disposing of sewage, the courts are not
inclined to regard the argument of public necessity very seriously. 46 And in
view of the direct opposition of such an interest to the overbalancing utility
in preserving the purity of the public drinking water, no other attitude could
be desirable. Though both are public uses, they are mutually antagonistic,
and the more important must prevail. 47 In general most courts uphold the
view that the legislature will not be presumed to have authorized what
amounts to a nuisance, and consequently pollution b~y municipalities is actionable or subject to injunction on the same principles that apply to private individuals, the fact that the sewer system
producing it has been constructed by
48
public authority being no defense.
The "public necessity" argument, however, has found one sponsor in
the Indiana judiciary. In that state, municipalities are allowed to pollute
streams so long as they do so by properly constructed sewer systems, 49 the
42. Though there is considerable disagreement among the authorities, it has been held
that a municipal corporation has the right as a riparian proprietor to use the water in the
stream on which it is located. City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. i9, 63 N. E. 6oo (19o2).
But see City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 6o6 (1881).
43. Western N. Y. Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 91 N. Y. Misc. 73, 154 N. Y.
Supp. IO46 (Sup. Ct. 1915); see Commonwealth v. Emmers, 221 Pa. 299, 304, 7o At. 762,

765 (io8).
44. Standen v. New Rochelle Water Co., 9i App. Div. 272, 36 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1895);
City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elev. Co., 123 Neb. 588, 243 N. W. 774 (1932).
45. City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 76 Conn. 447, 56 Atl. 856 (1904) ; Western
N. Y. Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 9i N. Y. Misc. 73, I54 N. Y. Supp. IO46 (Sup.
Ct. 1915).
46. Donnelly Brick Co. v. City of New Britain, io6 Conn. 167, 137 Atl. 745 (1927);
Barrington Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill.
11, I9i N. E. 239 (934).
47. For instance, in Philadelphia, which pours 15oooo,ooo to 200,000,000 gallons qf sewage
into the Delaware River daily the City Council has been notified by the chairman of the
State Sanitary Water Board that after March 31st the city will no longer be allowed to discharge into the Delaware or Schuylkill, in view of the "intolerable pollution of the waters
of the State." (See PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin, Dec. 5, 1935, p. 2.) The fact that the
1936 budget includes no appropriation for a new disposal program will probably not relieve
the city of its obligation. See Dep't of Health v. City of North Wildwood, 95 N. J.Eq. 442,
122 Atl. 891 (Ch. 1923) (in proceeding by state health department to compel city to cease
pollution of the waters of the state and to provide proper means for disposal of its sewage,
the fact that the city's bonded indebtedness already equalled the statutory limit held no defense).
48. Southern New England Ice Co. v. Town of West Hartford, 114 Conn. 496, 159 Atl.
470 (1932) ; Sammons v. City of Gloversville, 175 N. Y. 346, 67 N. E. 622 (1903) ; Mitchell
Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N. W. 390 (924).
49. City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N. E. 61o (1897) ; City of Valparaiso
v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1O62 (1899).
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theory being that in such case there is no taking of property but merely consequential injury which, as the city is not held accountable in the absence of
negligence, is damnum absque iniuria.5 0 Although not yet actually repudiated, the fallacy in the economic argument that the welfare of the inhabitants
of municipalities demands a special privilege in sewage disposal has been
pointed out by a member of the very court which sponsors it: necessity requires rather that the drinking supply be pure than that sewage disposal be
inexpensive. 51 And later cases have either expressly avoided the need for
considering the rule 52 or have cast doubt upon its soundness while making
53
every effort to find the municipality chargeable with negligence thereunder.
Indiana's gradual retraction of its unorthodox conception of social economics apparently leaves Massachusetts as the stanchest defender of cheap
municipal sewage systems. In that state, the doctrine that a municipal corporation possesses sufficient attributes of sovereignty to clothe it with a
degree of immunity is aided by an ingenious application of the rules of
agency and negligence law to reach the result that a city may foul a stream
as much as it desires so long as its agents who do the actual work take pains
to foul it carefully!

54

Frequently pollution cases take the form of an action at law for a
nuisance, that is, for a continuous and unreasonable interference with the
plaintiff's enjoyment of his land. 55 As the reasonableness of the defendant's
use of the stream under his riparian right forms the issue, it is tempting to
employ a technique analogous to that used in the common run of negligence
cases, wherein the merit of the defendant's conduct is determined by the
standard of the reasonably prudent man. However, the impropriety of
drawing the issue in pollution cases solely on the basis of whether or not the
defendant's fouling of the stream occurs as the result of his negligent conduct
in the pursuit of some activity on his land and of freeing him of liability
whenever the pollution is the necessary and unavoidable consequence of a
natural and careful use of his land has been clearly recognized. 56 While a
5o. That this formula is only the legal clothing of the court's conception of public economic interest is indicated by the fact that the same theory is not applied in cases of pollution by industrial corporations. Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N. E. 719
(igoo) ; cf. Barnard v. Shirley, 135 Ind. 547, 559, 34 N. E. 6oo, 604 (1893) ("Must it be

that one who lives on the lower lands on the banks of a stream shall forbid forever the ,founding of a city on the lands above, forbid the grading streets, the building of sewers, the erection of mills, factories, hospitals, or other means of livelihood, comfort and convenience of

the inhabitants?").

51. Myers, J., in Penn American Plate Glass Co. v. Schwinn, 177 Ind. 645, 658, 98 N. E.

715, 720 (1912).
52. See Zabst v. City of Angola, 99 Ind. App. III, 114, 19o N. E. 891, 892 (1934).

53. See City of Frankfort v. Slipher, 88 Ind. App. 356, 365, 162 N. E. 241, 243 (1928).
54. See Merrifield v. City of Worcester, iio Mass. 216, 221 (1872) ("This exemption of
municipal bodies and their officers from liability, and corresponding subordination of individual rights and interests to the safety, health and welfare of the general public, is a principle
of frequent application.") ; Anglim v. City of Brockton, 278 Mass. go, 99, 179 N. E. 289, 293

(1932).

55. This, of course, excludes that class of actions wherein the plaintiff, although his enjoyment is not at all interfered with, is awarded nominal damages on the theory that unless
such right of action is given the upper riparian will acquire a prescriptive right. Watson v.
New Milford, 72 Conn. 561, 45 Atl. 167 (1goo) ; see supra note i8.
56. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. & Con. Co. v. Polak, 7 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. gth,
1925) ; Hunze v. City of Cape Girardeau, 43 S. W. (2d) 882 (Mo. App. 1931); Straight v.
Hover, 79 Ohio St. 263, 87 N. E. 174 (igog). Contra: Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886). Cf. Verland Oil & Gas Co. v. Walker, Ioo Okla. 258, 229 Pac.
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certain similarity in terms that is misleading may sometimes be found in the
two classes of cases, the legal approach is distinctly different in each. The
reasonableness of the upper riparian polluter's use is not measured by any
foreseeable risk of probable harm ensuing to the lower riparian; it is rather a
question of the reasonableness or unreasonableness in character and extent
of the harm which actually does befall the plaintiff as a consequence of a use
which may have embodied the highest degree of care.5 7 When liability is
imposed for pollution it is likely to be "liability without fault."
Even in the field of negligence the scope of liability is being widened by
an enlightened application of principles of utility.58 In the field of."liability
without fault", where burdens and benefits are apportioned with regard to the
maintenance of economic and social equilibrium rather than as a result of
opprobrious conduct, and where such'matters as the non-negligent pollution
of streams really amount to problems in what Professor Harper has aptly
termed "social engineering", 59 it is even more imperative to measure legal
accountability by public value.
Ultimately, the questions of "right" and "wrong" must always be decided by reference to community standards and requirements-social, economic, and moral-in short, by reference to a shifting utility. And this
should be true whether the "wrong" is to be restrained by injunction or only
made the basis for compensation in damages. But with the right once thus
defined, it would seem to be both unnecessary and unjust to weigh the
particular economic burden expectable in a given case as-a basis' for awarding
or denying a remedy. Such philosophy may well be the foundation of
equity's repeated refusals to "balance the conveniences" in determining
whether an injunction is to issue against a nuisance:60 On the other hand,
the greater flexibility of remedial procedure in equity than at law makes it
possible, as well as desirable in many cases, to refuse specific relief in spite
235 (1924) (under statute providing no inflammable product from any oil or gas well shall
be permitted to run into any stream used for watering stock, held negligence per se for defendant to permit oil and salt water to flow into such stream). As to a class of nuisances the
essence of which is negligence, however, see opinion of Cardozo, C. J., in McFarlane v.
Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 16o N. E. 39I (1928).
57. See HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 182. There also seems to be, in such cases, somewhat
of an overlapping of the conception of reasonable use of the stream under the law of riparian
rights and the conception of an unreasonable disturbance of the plaintiff's enjoyment which
,forms the basis of a cause of action for a nuisance. However, the distinction is hardly possible in practice, and common sense clearly demands that the compartmentalism of the law
be disregarded in this instance.
58. "The law measures the risks that a man may legitimately take by measuring the
value of the interests furthered by his conduct." CARDOzo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL
SCIENCE (1928)

74.

"It is entirely natural that courts in highly industrialized states, in which the whole tone
of public opinion is favorable to the removal of every bar to effective production, should
tend to regard it as unreasonable to demand of industry any precautions which might check
intehsive production by making it unprofitable. On the other hand, in agricultural states it
is quite natural that no such regard should be paid to the supposedly harmful economic effect
of requiring decent consideration for the interest of the individual's life, limb, and property."
Bohlen, Old Phrasesand New Facts (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 305, 3o6-3o7.
59. HARPER, TORTS (933) § 155.
6o. See Barrington Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. i, 20, 191 N.
E. 239, 243 (934) ; Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 555, 57 Atl. io65,
1071 (1904) ("There can be no balancing of conveniences when such balancing involves the
preservation of an established right, though possessed by a peasant only to a cottage as his
home").
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of a clear legal right and to leave the complainant to his remedy at law.
Essentially a conception of what is "conscionable", 6' the proposition is most
frequently enunciated by saying that equity will not allow its relief to issue
where the result would be to place a disproportionate hardship on the defendant.6 2
This conception is one which cuts dearly across the whole field of equity
jurisdiction, whether it be in the specific enforcement of a contract, 63 in
relieving a continuing trespass, 64 or in enjoining a nuisance. 65 The refusal
to balance conveniences, however, appears to be a principle which is limited
to the third of these groups-the nuisance cases. Accordingly, it might be
somewhat more accurate to say that the principle is a single one: equitable
relief will not be awarded where it will produce disproportionate hardship;
but in nuisance cases the economic burden imposed on the defendant will
usually not be considered such a hardship. The theoretical reason for the
stricter rule as to nuisances may well be, as Professor Walsh has suggested,6 6
that in these cases the defendant is chargeable with intending such consequences as are ordinarily brought about by the activity in which he has chosen
to engage, whereas in a case of continuing trespass the encroachment is made
unwittingly.
At any rate, the very thought of these two coexistent but apparently
antagonistic ideas is usually enough to confuse the best of courts; and pollution cases seem unusually capable of inspiring such confusion, probably
because a weighing of social values (if not a "balancing of conveniences")
is usually so necessary in these cases. Even the Supreme Court of the United
States is not entirely free from criticism on this score. For instance, in a
recent case the Court's conclusion that the defendant would be subjected to
such grossly disproportionate hardship as to justify withholding an injunction was based on the fact that the cost of erecting an auxiliary sewage
disposal plant would be $25,000, whereas the loss in value of the complainant's land by virtue of the pollution was $ioo per year. 61 The better view
appears to be that mere monetary considerations should not persuade a denial
of equitable relief; and there is no more reason for a mercenary approach to
a case in which one party is a municipality than in a suit between private
parties. 68
On the other hand, some degree of apparent confusion in such cases is
certainly inevitable and should properly be regarded as a true indication of
the essential nature of the equitable remedy, which issues, not as a matter of
61. "What may be an entirely tolerable adjustment, when the result is only to award
damages for the injury done, may become no better than a means of extortion if the result
is absolutely to curtail the defendant's enjoyment of his land." Hand, J., in Smith v. Staso
Milling Co., I8 F. (2d) 736, 738 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
62. See Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, 338 (1933) ; Att'y Gen.
ex rel. Simmons v. City of Paterson, 6o N. J. Eq. 385, 393, 45 Atl. 995, 998 (i9oo).
63. See Willard v. Taylor, 8 Wall. 557, 567 (U. S. 1869).
64. See Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N. H. 572, 573, i5 Atl. 17, I8 (1888).

65. See Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 167 Fed. 342, 365 (C. C. Mont. i9og).
66. See WALsH, EQuiTY (1930) 289.
67. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334 (933).
68. Cf. Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, io Ariz. Igo, ioO Pac. 47o (igo9), aff'd, 23o
U. S. 46 (913).
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strict right, but of grace. 69 The chancellor's problem can hardly be described
in better words than those of Judge Hunt :7o
". ..
when there are two citizens, each of whom is engaged in a
lawful business, one in mining, the other in farming, and there comes a
conflict where neither can enjoy his own property without interfering
to some extent with his neighbor in the enjoyment of his, then it is that
the problem is presented how to fix the rights of each so as to secure to
each the largest measure of liberty possible under all the circumstances of
the particular case. Then it is that the court should so frame its decree
as to avoid .the destruction of the rights of either. . . . Equitable
arrangements may often be made when we recognize the principle that,
as a philosophic condition of the complexities of society, to some extent
men must yield the full enjoyment of certain individual rights."
As intimated in the excerpt just quoted, the supervisory powers of
equity are of fundamental importance. And since the conflicting claims confronting a chancellor in stream pollution cases usually require some sort of
compromise to reconcile them, it is essential that these powers be liberally
used in the framing of decrees, if truly equitable results are to be attained.
Generally, the courts are hesitant to issue so flat an injunction as to compel
the permanent dosing of an industrial plant, though in a few rare and exceptionally clear cases this has been done. 7 1 But short of this, the proper extent
for a decree has been a matter of considerable difference of opinion. Some
courts still insist that the province of injunctive relief is confined to negation and that the means of abating the nuisance must be left to the choice of
the defendant.72 But fortunately, judicial reluctance to issue a mandatory
order seems to be in the minority, the prevailing view being the saner one
that the consummation
of equity's functions is in decrees which order positive
73
conduct.
The temptation to charge the courts with being the creatures of vested
interest has captivated not a few writers, with but specious justification for
their carping. While there are certainly glaring exceptions, a fair estimate
of the general judicial attitude in the field under discussion leads to the
impression that most courts act not only honorably but wisely when they
recognize extra-legal influences in a problem which is less a legal than an
69. See Richard's Appeal, 51 Pa. IO5 (1868). To the effect that "grace" is not arbitrary and that the chancellor's discretion as to what is conscionable depends, not on his own
mere notions, but on community standards of justice and reasonableness, see Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 557, 25 Atl. 125, 127 (892) ; Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 2o8
Pa. 540, 554, 57 Atl. io65, 1071 (904).
70. In Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 167 Fed. 342, s69 (C. C. Mont. i9Og).
71. One such case is Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 2o8 N. Y. i, ioi N. E. 8o5
01913).

72. Behnisch v. Cedarburg Dairy Co., i8o Wis. 34, 192 N. W. 447 (1923)

(decree re-

quiring defendant to fix its septic tank to comply with public health laws, to flush the creek
whenever ordered to do so by the board of health, and to connect up with a sewer then in
process of construction held unwarranted).
73. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U. S. 474 (1915) (decree required defendant
to keep daily records, appointed a university professor as inspector, and specified that defendant should not permit the escape of gases having a sulphur content of more than 20 tons
per day); New York v. Blum, 2o8 N. Y. 237, io N. E. 869 (913) (decree required defendant to allow plaintiff city to clean defendant's duck pond and install a filter at its outlet
once a month).
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economic one. Criticism of their inconsistency is easy, when a tribute to
their realism would be more deserved.
Although the public as a whole remains apathetic, and there would seem
to be few groups (save the Izaak Walton League) possessed of an unqualified desire to see the nation's rivers completely pure, there has been some
agitation of late "to do something about river pollution." At present proposals are being formulated, apparently under the sponsorship of Senator
Lonergan, for Congressional legislation which would set up a Federal River
Pollution Control Board. 7 4 While the problem of the fouling of interstate
rivers 75 and the concomitant questions of interstate compacts 76 and suits
between the states in the United States Supreme Court"7 are as important
as they are interesting, yet the great weight of pollution is felt in local waters,
and the bulk of reported litigation is between local parties. Some sort of
central advisory committee of scientific and economic experts might well
prove helpful, but direct control by federal authority seems hardly feasible
from either a constitutional or a practical viewpoint. The courts, by combining a frank avowal that the question of "reasonable use" is essentially a
matter of utility and public welfare with a readiness to employ the super-.
visory powers of equity, can probably do more to insure a sane control of
river pollution than can be expected from governing boards or federal commissions.
V. J. R., Jr.
Investments by Fiduciaries in Pennsylvania
On January 3, 1936, the Secretary of Banking reported that over five
billions of dollars in trust funds were held by state institutions, primarily
trust companies, and nearly a half billion by the trust departments of national
banks within the state.1 However, these figures indicate only partially the
vast importance of fiduciary investments in Pennsylvania, since they do not
include a huge, unascertained amount held by private fiduciaries. And the
proportion of trust funds is steadily increasing. 2 Small wonder, then, that
the administration of these funds is the subject of frequent legislation and
more frequent litigation.
At one time, most trust cases dealt with the existence or creation of a
trust.3 Today, trust litigation deals primarily with its administration, either
in the investment of the res or in the distribution of the proceeds. As regards
distribution, the law has been quite thoroughly developed, and, although di74.
75.
76.
77.

See Lonergan, op. cit. supra note i; cf. PhiladelphiaRecord, Feb. 7, 1936, p. 14.
See Garner, The Chicago Sanitary District Case (1928) 22 Am. J. INT. L. 837.
See (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. i69; (1934) 2 Gw. WASH. L. REV. 242.
See Missouri v. Illinois, 18o U. S. 208 (igoi) ; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S.
336 (1931) ; Burch, Conflicting Interests of States over Interstate Waters (1932) io TENTN.
L. REv. 267; Kelly, "A River is a Treasure" (1934) 2o Amf. B. A. J. 559.
I.4425,697,284.98. These figures, compiled as of Nov. I, 1935, do not include corporate
trusts. 22 DEP'T REP. OF PA. (1936) 30.
2. BuslNEss W=EK, Dec. 14, 1935, at 24, 27.
3. It is interesting to note that more than half of ScoTT, CASES ON TRUSTS (2d ed.
1931), is devoted to existence of a trust, while only one chapter is devoted to administration,

and one section within that chapter to investment by trustees.
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vergent results have been reached by various jurisdictions, the doctrine of
Earp'sAppeal appears to be immutable in Pennsylvania. 4 The problems of
investment, however, remain vexatious, with the courts and legislatures constantly striving to preserve the principal of the fund and at the same time
to procure the largest possible return for the beneficiary, and on the other
hand to protect the fiduciary in his choice of investments. 5 Pennsylvania
history shows continual enactment of laws prescribing investments, the primary motive, as in the conservative majority of the states, apparently being
conservation of the principal.6 The latest attempt to attain this goal, the
Fiduciaries Act of July 2, 1935, is a broad advancing stride, putting Pennsylvania in the liberal middle group with New York. Yet, while the new
law has the salutary effect of broadening the scope of legal investments and
thus according the fiduciary more freedom of choice, it fails to solve numerous existing problems, and raises new ones.
The cases involving trust investments have been numerous, too. As
was pointed out in a recent issue of this REvIEw, "the trust questions most
frequently litigated or in process of adjustment generally involve attempts to
surcharge trustees with losses predicated either on investment in non-legal
securities or on unauthorized retention of non-legal investments acquired
from the estate of the testator or settlor." 8 In such cases, the fiduciary must
first show, in order to avoid surcharge, that his investment is valid because
of the authority given him by the settlor, the beneficiaries, or the "legal list"
of either the common law or statutes. 9
Due Care and Prudence
Assuming the type of investment made to be authorized, the particular
investment involved must, in addition, have been selected or retained "with
4. For a complete discussion of the Pennsylvania view on distribution, see Note (1935)
83 U.

OF

PA. L. REV. 773. This problem will not be considered here.

5. As to the purposes of trust investment law, see 19 REP. STATE BAR Ass'N OF WIS.
(1929) 17, 18.
6. See Hart's Estate (No. i), 203 Pa. 480, 484, 53 AtI. 364, 366 (19o2). For a sketchy
history, see pamphlet, TRuST INVESTMENTS IN PA. (935), published by the Pennsylvania
Bankers Association, at 9 et seq.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) § 8O. See TRuST INVESTMENTS IN PA. (1935)
13-14.
8. Zoob, Exceptions to the LIabilities of Trustees (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 726. The
question whether an investment is legal, however, may mean other things than "Shall the
fiduciary be surcharged?", e. g.: Shall the beneficiary (or estate) be bound by the questioned
transaction? Bagnell v. Ives, 184 Fed. 466 (C. C. M. D. Pa. 1911), where an estate was freed
from liability on an unpaid stock subscription balance. Is the other party to the transaction
bound? Metzger v. Lehigh Valley Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 220 Pa. 535, 69 Atl. 1037

(i9O8), held no in a very dubious decision. Shall the trustee be removed? Conyngham's
Trust Estate, 9 Lanc. Bar, no. 16, at 57 (1877) (mere illegal investment insufficient ground).
Nevertheless, all except six of nearly one hundred fifty cases studied were efforts to surcharge or otherwise impose liability on the fiduciary for making or continuing an improper
investment. In one very interesting case, surcharge was sought for failure to keep a nonlegal investment on the ground that its further retention would have netted a greater profit!
In re Scott, 22 D. & C. 351 (1935). The present note will be confined mainly to questions
of surcharge.
9. "Legal list" and "legal investments" are practically synonymous. Logically, any investment is legal that is upheld by a court. These terms have, however, taken on technical
meanings, and include only those investments which statutes, and once the common law,
enumerated as those which may be made with impunity.
That the burden of proof is on the fiduciary, primarily because he must account for his
funds, is generally recognized. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 172, Comment b; Kelch's
Estate, 21 D. & C. 2o4 (1934).

But cf. Macfarlane's Estate, 317 Pa. 377, 177 Atl. 12 (1935).
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due care and prudence". Thus, although the settlor had given the trustee
discretionary power, the latter was surcharged for investment in bank stock,
one of the grounds for surcharge being that the bank had suspended specie
payment at the time of investment.' 0 Similarly, although the "legal list"
included obligations of the City of Philadelphia, the Orphans' Court refused
to sanction such an investment where the obligation was selling at too high a
premium.:"
But what constitutes due care and prudence? Upon this question, the
Pennsylvania decisions have been confusing, though not uniquely so. At
first, they seemed clear enough, holding, for example, that the fact that the
settlor had invested in certain stock, 12 or that a prudent man would invest in
the stock of a private corporation,' 3 did not of itself relieve the trustee from
surcharge. The judges would sanction no hazards with trust funds. A
fiduciary was to be a conservator of funds, not an accumulator, and, consequently, was required to take greater care than the ordinary investor.
In later cases appear new and equally vague standards: "negligence",
''supine negligence which is required in order to charge a trustee", ''gross
negligence", "wilful neglect or default".' 4 By 1902, however, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had definitely rejected these loose expressions, and, in
Hart's Estate (No. i), after expressly repudiating them, surcharged the
trustee, who had been granted discretionary powers, on the ground that:
"he has all the knowledge, foresight and judgment of the business man;
but the money to invest is not his own but belongs to others; it is his
plain duty, if he would safely keep it, to minimize risks. He is not
bound to have more prudence than the other, but he must utilize his, in
avoiding risks which the one who owes no duties to others is free to
take." 15

In 1930, the court analyzed its standard a bit further, allowing fiduciaries to
retain investments, when authorized, "unless facts known to them, or which
by ordinary watchfulness could have been known to them, rendered the holding of such securities an act of which it is inconceivable that one desiring to
do his duty would, in the exercise of 'ordinary good business judgment or
foresight,' have been guilty." 16
While the cases do not expressly so state, they indicate that the Pennsylvania court will require that, when the fiduciary, if alert, would receive
information which should indicate to him as a person diligently seeking to
conserve the estate of another person that the safety of the principal is threatened or that the income is unduly low with respect to a particular investment,
he must not make such an investment. Or, if it has already been made, he
io. Morris v. Wallace, 3 Pa. 319 (1846).
ii. Estate of Shields, 14 Phila. 307 (88).
(Stephen Girard, the settlor, had left United
12. Hemphill's Appeal, i8 Pa. 303 (852)
States Bank stock to a different beneficiary, Girard College).
13. Worrell's Appeal, 23 Pa. 44 (1854).
14. Jack's Appeal, 94 Pa. 367 (i88o) ; Appeal of Stewart, iio Pa. 41o, 6 Atl. 321 (885);

Bailey's Appeal, i Sadler 398, 5 Atl. 49 (Pa. 1886).
15. 2o3 Pa. 480, 485-486, 53 Atl. 364, 366 (i9o2). See also Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 5,8,
529, 121 AtI. 310, 313 (1923) ; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 501, 135 Atl. 112, 113 (1926).
i6. Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 37, 148 Atl. 912, 914 (1930).
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must discontinue it within a reasonable time.' 7 The fiduciary should seek the
advice of his attorney, banker, or financial adviser (Moody's, e. g.), for,
although not an absolute defense,' 8 such action is evidence of due care and
prudence. 10 Speculation is absolutely indefensible,2210 as is retention of nonlegals without giving any thought to their disposal.
But these considerations tend only to discover whether an individual
investment, standing alone, appears to be safe. Sad experience has taught
numerous investors that defaults cannot be predicted by study of the investment independently. Insurance is essential, and most expert investors insure
by diversification, which, if not carried to extremes, is unquestionably
sound.2 2 Yet one court refused to hold that diversification was part of the
duty of care and prudence of the fiduciary, observing that investors differed
as to the desirability of diversification, and quoting Andrew Carnegie's
motto, "Put all your eggs in one basket and watch the basket." 23 This,
however, is too speculative a motto for trust investments. It is not surprising, therefore, that a growing minority, now supported
by the American Law
24
Institute, requires that the fiduciary spread his eggs.
Unfortunately, the question whether due care and prudence includes a
duty to diversify has seldom appeared before the Pennsylvania courts. As
early as 1865, nonetheless, a Philadelphia court seemed to approve such a
requirement, for, although the court upheld the investment of one-sixth of
an estate in obligations of the United States, it is said obiter, "no sane man
would invest all in one class of securities." 25 But a recent Montgomery
County Orphans' Court case renounces any such legal standard. Although the
refusal to surcharge could have been put on other grounds, this court went
out of its way to point out that diversification is not a legal standard of conduct for the fiduciary. 2 6 Although the question has never been presented
17. For a view that the standard for continuance of investments is less exacting than for
the making of new investments, see Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 5o1, 135 Atl. 112, 113 (1926).
Logically, the fiduciary should be held to an equally high standard, with an allowance of reasonable time within which to dispose of the non-legals. PROC. NINTH REGIONAL TRUST
CONF. (1931) 45; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 231.
I8. Lechler's Appeal, IO Sadler 547 (Pa. 1888) ; Grossman's Estate, 22 D. & C. 531

(1935) ; 3 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 612; MCKINxET, TRUST
INVESTMENTS (2d ed. 1927) 31.
ig. 'Jack's Appeal, 94 Pa. 367 (i88o); see Hammett's Estate, 23 D. & C. 353, 36o
(1935) ; cf. Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 Ati. 54 (1922).
The mere fact that Moody's

has stopped rating, or even that the earnings are dropping off, is not enough, however, to
hold that the investing fiduciary has failed to employ due care and prudence. Hammett's
Estate, supra. But, if the earnings statement shows danger, investment is imprudent. Id.
at 36o.
2o. Hart's Estate (No. I).
21. Kelch's Estate, 21 D. & C. 204 (1934).
22. JAMES G. SMrrH, DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITM STATES
(1928) 427-453; Y. B. AM. BANKERS' Ass'N TRUST DnSIoN (1934-1935) 202 (diversification in retention) ; Wilson, Standardsfor Conserving Investments (1935) 61 TRUST COMPANIES 7, i0; Woodruff, Legal and Investment Standardsof Trstees (1935) 4 FORDHAM L.
REV. 391 (an excellent discussion by an investment analyst for the Alexander Hamilton Institute) ; Brookmire Investor, Dec. 14, 1935, at 2.
23. Estate of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345, 352, 260 N. Y. Supp. 173, I8I (Surr. Ct. 1932).
24. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 228. See also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft,
1933) § 22o and explanatory notes thereto.
25. Estate of Naglee, 6 Phila. 28, 29-30 (1865).
26. Elkins' Estate, 20 D. & C. 483, 487-489 (1934). It is interesting to note here that
not only is there a movement toward higher standards for fiduciaries in general, but there is
a growing tendency to hold corporate fiduciaries to higher standards than those required of
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squarely to the supreme court of the state, it is hardly likely that this traditionally conservative court will follow the new view. Legislative action
would seem highly desirable, therefore.
Sources of Power to Invest
"Consent, Affirmation, and Release." It seems fundamental that due
care and prudence, and even diversification, will not avail the fiduciary if he
has no power to make the type of investment he has made. Under our law,
this power need not be given by the settlor or the legal list, but may be given
by the beneficiaries. According to one writer, who dubs this source of power
"consent, affirmation and release", consent, affirmation, release, waiver, approval, acquiescence, estoppel, ratification, and even volenti non fit injuriahave
been the basis of this defense to surcharge.2 7 The very strong objection to
allowing these as a defense to surcharge is that the settlor did not intend it.
The very reason for the fiduciary relationship was that the settlor wished to
guard the beneficiary against his own imprudence. Allowing the defense permits the substitution for the fiduciary's discretion of the very discretion which
the settlor distrusted. Especially is this true with regard to spendthrift trusts,
and some courts have balked at going the distance of allowing a "spendthrift"
thus to free the trustee of responsibility.2 6 Yet, in Perkins's Trust Estate,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court went so far as to hold, not merely that the
spendthrift was barred, but even that the contingent legatees were barred, by
that investments be made in realty in
the spendthrift's active persuasion
29
which he had a personal interest.
A court which will go to such lengths is, of course, a stronghold for the
defense of "consent, affirmation, and release". At one time, however, Pennsylvania was firmly against it. In Nyce's Estate (1843), for example, a
trustee was surcharged, even though the cestui que trust's guardian had approved the purchase of United States Bank stock, simply on the guardian's
word that he had not intended to assume responsibility."0 In Hemphill's
Appeal, the next case in which this defense was interposed, it was held that
Mrs. Hemphill's acceptance of the dividends on similar stock could have no
effect on the judgment. She was not bound to direct the trustees. "The
object of their appointment was to protect her against her own imprudence." "I And in Prays Appeals (1859), even though there were other
grounds on which to predicate surcharge, the court said:
private fiduciaries. One attorney advised his clients, trust company men, that they were held
to higher standards, and rightly so. PRoc. NINTH REGIONAL TRUST COrF. (1931) 45. Zoob,
supra note 8, at 735n, quotes the suggestion of a higher standard because the companies make
it their business to administer trusts and hold themselves out as experts. As far as Pennsylvania is concerned, the Supreme Court seemed quite receptive to the idea, but refused to apply

it to the case at hand because of the weaknesses in that particular case.
299

Pa. 32, 39, 148 At.

912,

914

Linnard's Estate,

(1930).

27. The general discussion of this subject in Zoob, supra note 8, is more than adequate.
For a recent discussion of the maxim volenti ni fit' bthiria, see City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 292, 293, 189 N. E. 222, 223 (1934).
28.
29.
(1933),
30.
31.

See Zoob, supra note 8, at 741.
314 Pa. 49, 17o Atl. 255 (1934), citing Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 Atl. 597
where appointees of the "content" beneficiary were barred.
5 W. & S. 254 (Pa. 1843).
18 Pa. 303, 307 (1852).
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"As no power was reserved to these two married women in the will
creating the trust, to control or interfere with the investment of the
funds, or the management of the estate, their previous request to make
the investments, or assent to them afterwards, could not in any degree
diminish, alter, or affect, the responsibility of the trustee." 82
But the last quarter of the nineteenth century brought a period of
greater leniency with fiduciaries in Pennsylvania. Perhaps the advocacy of
the late and great John G. Johnson is responsible. At any rate, whether to
induce men, otherwise deterred, to assume trust duties, or to relieve them
from continued harassing by beneficiaries, or to provide a means of flexibility,8 3 the court's attitude changed. In i88o it approved a lower court's
holding that the cestuis que trustent were barred by their silent approval for
five years, because during this time they could easily have obtained a court
order to sell the non-legals. 34 More recently it refused to surcharge where
there was evidence that the beneficiary knew all the details of the investment
and yet failed to object.8 5 A fortiori, where the beneficiary requests an
investment,8" or accepts the dividends with full knowledge of the investment,3 7 or agrees to it in writing, 38 the court will not surcharge the fiduciary.
One cannot predict to what extent it will go. To describe what conduct of
the beneficiary may operate to bar him, the court has used various terms:
estoppel, 39 approval, agreement, ratification, contentment, and acquiescence. 40
No doubt other terms can also be found. The net result is that there is not
only a lack of uniformity and accuracy, but there is no dividing line which
will indicate what conduct will and what will not bar the beneficiary.
At least greater uniformity and a clearer standard should be attained.
If the rule is that the competent and sui juris beneficiary, once he knows of
the illegality of the investment, must object to it and must reject the benefits
in order that the fiduciary be surchargable, the court should lay down that
rule but should also require the fiduciary to inform the beneficiary that this
is the necessary procedure. The beneficiary should not be presumed to know
32.

34 Pa. 100, 113-114 (1859).

33. As to deterrence, see Zoob, supra note 8, at 733. Perkins's Trust Estate is an excellent illustration of annoyance by the beneficiary. On the other hand, the flexibility allowed is obvious. How often the beneficiary's creditors are pressing him, or his mortgage
is about to be foreclosedl The objection still remains, however, that the settlor never intended investments such as loans to the cestui que trust. And yet, would he have sat by idly
and watched the cestui qtw triest's ruin? Limitations are recommended in PRoc. NINTH
REGIoNAL TRUST CONF. (193)
46.
34. Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426 (Pa. i88o).
35. Macfarlane's Estate, 317 Pa. 377, 177 At]. 12 (1935). Contrast Frame's Estate,
N. Y. L. J., Dec. 31, 1935, at 2671 (App. Div. 1st Dept) : "There is no duty on the part of
the beneficiaries to demand that executors dispose of non-legal securities."
36. Perkins's Trust Estate.
37. Macfarlane's Estate, 317 Pa. 377, 177 At. 12 (1935) ; O'Brien's Estate, i8 D. & C.
501 (1933).
38. Armitage's Estate, I95 Pa. 582, 46 At. 117 (I9OO).
39. Perkins's Trust Estate, 314 Pa. 49, 51, 17o Atl. 255, 256 (I934). See also Armitage's
Estate, 195 Pa. 582, 587, 46 AtI. 117, 122 (I9oo) ; Estate of Clermontel, 12 Phila. i39, 141
(1878). Zoob, supra note 8, 735 et seq., severely criticizes this doctrine of estoppel.
40. Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426, 445 (Pa. 188o) (approval) ; Armitage's Estate, 195 Pa.
582, 588, 46 Atl. 117, 123 (I9OO) (agreement) ; Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 346, 117 Atl. 54,
56 (1922) (approval and ratification) ; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 504, 135 Atl. 112, 114
(1926) (agreement) ; Curran's Estate,,312 Pa. 416, 424, 167 At. 597, 599 (I933) (contentment) ; O'Brien's Estate, I8 D. & C. 501, 502 (1933) (acquiescence) ; Maser's Estate, 21 D.
& C. 559, 56I (1934) (ratification). Numerous other illustrations may be found.
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the law. A more salutary rule would be to bar the beneficiary only when he,
sui juris,competent, and with full knowledge, agrees in advance and in writing to the illegal investment. In such a case, he could more readily be
expected to give thought to the matter. Silence and inactivity, or even
acceptance of the benefits-often not a matter of choice-indicate no thought
about the desirability of the investment. An even more advanced rule would
be necessary to approximate the intent of the settlor: total abolition of "consent, affirmation, and release" as a defense. But since this rule might occasionally work a hardship, it should be complemented by a provision that the
orphans' or common pleas courts should, upon petition, grant antecedent
permission to investment in non-legals provided that the exigencies of the
case warrant this extraordinary remedy.
The Intent of the Settlor. Little difficulty is encountered when the settlor clearly indicates what investments shall be made. However, as such an
occasion is the exception rather than the rule, difficulties in interpretation
ensue.
One source of trouble has been that since the middle of the last century,
numerous settlors (usually testators) have provided the fiduciary with discretionary powers. 4 1 At first, the Pennsylvania courts were quite prone to
find that an expression of discretionary power authorized non-legal investments. One judge, disagreeing with the court for which he was speaking,
took the view that the settlor must have expressed a clear intention that the
discretion was to extend to the making or continuance of investments. 42 The
present view of the supreme court is this stricter view, and the same dissenting judge is quoted in an oft-cited case, Taylor's Estate:
"'This [the investment in nonlegal securities] may be authorized
by the creator of the trust, but where such a provision is relied on, it is
for the trustee to establish it with the utmost clearness, and, when
shown, it will be strictly construed. . . . The power ought not to be
sustained upon conjecture, nor inferred from . . . express grant of

discretion as to matters not relating to the management of the [particular] fund [before the court]. The presumption is against the existence of such a power, and all doubts should be resolved against the party
asserting it.'

" 43

Nevertheless, where the settlor indicates with clarity that the fiduciary
shall have discretionary power as to investments or that he shall make particular investments, the fiduciary has a definite safeguard, unless the directions are against public policy.14 Impolitic directions being rare, however,
41. Whitaker, The Problem of Legal Investments for Trust Funds (1934)

Q. 473, 480.

8 Tmep. L.

42. Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. 518, 529, 28 At. 365, 367 (1894).
43. 277 Pa. 518, 523-524, 121 At. 310, 311 (1923). Accord: In re Safe Deposit Bank
of Pottsville, ig D. & C. 695 (1933).
44. E. g., where the settlor directs investment in an unlawful business. Nor can the provisions of the Banking Code that prohibit transfer of assets from the commercial departments of trust companies to their trust departments [PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 7,
§ 81g-i11i] be waived by a settlor's provision that an investment may be made in mortgages,
even though not earmarked for trusts when acquired by the company. Investments for Life
Insurance Trust, 21 D. & C. 127 (1934) (Opinion of Deputy Attorney-General Saylor).
But, unless expressly indicated to the contrary, the fiduciary is held to his duty to use
due care and prudence, even though he has discretionary powers. Supra p. 642.
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the setting of boundaries to the investing power by the settlor is to be strenuously urged. It is truly fortunate that trust instruments are becoming
increasingly instructive. Many are not, though, and in such cases resort
must be made to legal investments.
The Common Law. In cases where the settlor had failed to prescribe;
investments or to grant discretionary power, the English courts early limited
the fiduciary to prescribed classes of investment. At first only government
obligations were permitted. Soon afterwards England's foremost property
became the basis for an extension of the rule-first mortgages on realty
became legal investments. Most American jurisdictions adopted the same
rule, but some, like Massachusetts, leader of the "radical minority", relaxed
it. Pennsylvania followed the narrower view45and, like numerous other jurisdictions, soon enacted statutes on the subject.

Statutory Investments. In 1824 a statute virtually embodying the English rule was enacted, authorizing the orphans' court, upon petition, to direct
investment in the debt of the United States, of the Commonwealth, and of
the City of Philadelphia, or in real securities. 40 This rule was periodically
expanded, from about 1850, until it included the obligations of certain other
municipalities within the state, and also of the Pennsylvania47 and Reading
Railroads and of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company.
Whether or not as a result of this special legislation, Article III, Section
22 of the Constitution of 1873 was adopted, prohibiting the General Assembly from authorizing investment in the bonds or stock of any private corporation. 48 Ensuing legislation permitted investment in the obligations of
the United States, the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions; first
mortgages (including participation certificates) on property within the state,
not exceeding two-thirds of its fair value; ground rents on domestic property ; 4 9 and in obligations of the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commis-

sion. 50 Statutes authorizing investment in Joint-Stock Land Bank Bonds
and Farm Loan Bonds were, however, unconstitutional in the opinion of the
attorney-general, 5 ' while a local court declared unconstitutional a law authorizing investment in life insurance, on the ground that this was investment in
an obligation inferior even to a bond of a private corporation. 52 Some of
this legislation hearkened back to the days of indiscriminate special legislation.
A very sound extension, the Law of June 17, 1917, permitted the
orphans' court, upon petition, to authorize investment in domestic realty or
45. (I921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. I89.
46. Pa. Laws 1824, C.24.
47. TRuST INVESTMENTS IN PA. (935)

9-10.

48. PA. CoNsT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) art. III, § 22.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 20, § 8oi.
50. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 36, § 34oi, art. VII, believed valid by Deputy
Attorney-General Saylor. Delaware River Joint Commission Bonds, 21 D. & C. 566 (934)
(on ground that Commission was not private corporation, and hence constitution did not prohibit).
5i. Joint-Stock Land Bank Bonds as Trust Investments, 4 D. & C. 55 (923), on the
ground that, since the government did not guarantee the obligations, they were obligations
of private corporations. Similarly, in Investment of Trust Funds in Farm Loan Bonds, I9
D. & C. 287 (1933).
52. Solomon's Petition, 77 Pitts. L. J. 545 (I929), involving PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 20, § 804.
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in the public debt of other states and municipalities. 53 Yet few fiduciaries
have availed themselves of their right to petition, apparently because of the
inconvenience of the procedure.
But many fiduciaries have made borderline investments, producing surprising results. For instance, no credit has been allowed for investments in
mortgages on property outside the state, although, by the use of ingenious
reasoning, an investment in Camden real estate was upheld. 54 A corporation's mortgage was upheld as a legal investment, 55 as were the real "estate
bonds of a "straw man" who actually represented a corporation owning the
Shubert Theater, the corporation having assumed the obligation, 56 despite
the objections that these were the obligations of private corporations. Local
courts went even farther, one allowing an investment in the stock of a mortgage company, where mortgages underlay the stock, 57 and another, a twentyyear endowment policy for a minor. 58
The explanation for these efforts of the state's courts to interpret the
constitutional restriction of 1873 broadly is to be found in their sympathy
53. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,

193o) tit. 2o, § 804.
54. Consistency is no attribute of the court. As early as i85o, the supreme court had
said that it would not authorize investments in places to which its jurisdiction did not extend.
Rush's Estate, 12 Pa. 375, 378 (i85o). Similar reasoning supported the result in Trust Estate
of Pawnall, 2 Lanc. Bar, no. 47, at I (1871). The court apparently felt there was some advantage in its jurisdiction over the property in which investments were made, although this
attitude has been criticized as mere provincialism. Thus, in Hart's Estate, one of the grounds
,for surcharge was that the investment had been made outside the jurisdiction. Yet the court
upheld the investment in Camden realty on the ground that, for business purposes (a far cry
from "jurisdiction"), Camden was practically a suburb of Philadelphia. Gouldey's Estate,
201 Pa. 491, 5I Atl. 315 (19o2).
This so-called provincialism is also found in the statutes.
Supra note 53.
55. Maroney's Estate, 3IH Pa. 336, 166 AtI. 914 (1933). The court reasoned that the
constitution aimed only at "personal securities", and that the mortgage was actually "real
security"; the mere addition of the personal obligation in the form of the corporation's bond
should make no difference.
56. Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 Atl. 597 (1933), citing Maroney's Estate, supra
note 55, and holding that, in substance, real security was involved. An early case, Twaddel's
Appeal, 5 Pa. i5 (1847), although not cited by the court, seems to support the results in
these two cases. Apparently contra, however, are: Commonwealth ex rel. Algeo v. McConnell, 226 Pa. 244, 75 At. 367 (igio) ; Huey's Estate, i Chester Co. 170 (0880).
57. In re Duggan's Account, 83 Pitts. L. J. 237 (i935). This, if appealed, will be a
difficult case to handle. In Curran's Estate and Maroney's Estate, both supra note 56, the
actual investment made by the fiduciary was in a mortgage, or in a bond directly secured by
a mortgage, so that the reasoning that they involve real security is not nearly so far fetched
as here, where, although the purpose of the corporation is to invest in first mortgages, only
the personal security of the corporation is involved. Another objection to allowing the investment is that the fiduciary has delegated his power to invest to the officers of the corporation. This was never intended by the settlor. Iscovitz's Estate, 319 Pa. 277, 179 Adt.
548 (I935) ; 3 BoGMT, op. cit. supra note i8, at 1774.
58. Price's Estate, x9 D. & C. 266 (i933). Since this arose on petition of the guardian
for permission, it is unlikely to be considered by the supreme court, unless the ward, on coming of age, feels injured. The case appears legalistically incorrect in light of the reasoning
in Solomon's Petition, swpra note 52, to the effect that this is investment in a personal or corporate obligation. The distinction that an endowment policy is directly for the benefit of the
minor, while life insurance is not, is, of course, sound. On the other hand, the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy is ordinarily available to the insured.
The desirability of insurance is, nevertheless, manifest, and the General Assembly no
doubt thought so. The validity of the act involved in Solomon's Petition would in all probability, if raised again, not be upheld, in spite of the constitutional amendment of 1933. See
infra, p. 649. See also Fima, EFFEcr OF AN UxcoNsrrruTioxAL STATUTE (935) 288-294
New legislation, pursuant to the amendment, validating investment in insurance, would be
highly commendable, therefore.
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for a fiduciary who had to invest and was faced with a narrow list of legal
investments, an increasing volume of trust funds, and a natural desire for
increased income on the part of beneficiaries. The same situation was responsible for a constitutional change. In addition, the sunshine philosophy
of 1929 and the corresponding decrease in purchasing power of those who
depended on fixed returns, notably beneficiaries of trusts, rendered the state
legislature quite responsive to the amendment proposed by the Pennsylvania
Bankers Association. When the proposed change reached the people at the
polls, however, gloom had replaced the sunshine, and a campaign of education
was necessary to induce the people to approve even a change which would
permit the legislature to authorize investment in stocks! Yet the voters
carried the amendment, in November, 1933, repealing the prior constitutional
limitation and providing that the General Assembly might from time to time
prescribe investments for fiduciaries. 5 9
The FiduciariesAct of July 2, 1935. No exercise of this new legislative prerogative was attempted until last summer, when the General Assembly passed a bill adopting practically verbatim a proposal of the Pennsylvania
Bankers Association. 60 Apparently no thought was given to the serious
problems which have arisen concerning "due care and prudence", and "consent, affirmation, and release". A bare provision to the effect that a fiduciary
must use due care and prudence was included, in order that the Act "would,
to a certain extent, serve as a code" of trust investment law."' And, although
it purports to be a code and includes at least references to nearly all of the
other problems, it makes absolutely no reference to the rule that conduct of
the beneficiary may prevent surcharge, with the result that at least two vexatious problems remain."'
Ostensibly the main purpose of the new law is to provide fiduciaries with
a broader list of investments. This is done primarily through the introduction as legal investments of those bonds of railroads, gas, electric, and water
companies, and telephone companies, that meet the stringent financial requirements of the Act.0 3 According to a study made by the bankers' association,
278 new securities meet the tests. 64 Whether such securities should have
been made proper types of investment for fiduciaries is a disputed matter.
Some experts would limit investments to government obligations; others feel
that the new law is sufficiently conservative; 6 5 still others suggest that different standards should be employed; 66 and a number would be even bolder
and invest in equities.17 In view of this divergence of opinion, the question
59. PA. CONST. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) art. III, § 22. For a history of its enactment, see
13-14.
TRUST INVESTMENTS IN PA. (935)
6o. Cf. pamphlet, Proposed Statutory Limitations on Trust Investments, issued by the
bankers' association in 1935, with PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 80.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 8oi (3) (a). See TRUST INVESTMENTS
IN PA. (935) 33.
62. Perhaps the inclusion in the new act of provisions respecting "consent, etc.," would
have been unwise, since the latter problem is not confined to the field of investment. A separate act might be preferable.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 8oI, 8-1o.
64. TRUST INVEsTMENTS IN PA. (935) 38-57.
65. Y. B. BANKERS' Ass'N TRUST DIvIsIoN (1934-1935) 8I; (I935) 6I TRUST COMPANIES 12.

66. Wilson, supra note 22, at 12.
67. Symposium on the Future Trend of Living Costs (1935) 6i TRUST COMPANIES 25
et seq., wherein outstanding economists predict a rise in the price level, and recommend
equities, diversification, and constant revision of investment portfolios.
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was properly one for the legislature. What is regrettable is that the legislature gave this important matter of policy no attention on the floor. In the
light of the stringent financial limitations imposed, of the urgent necessity
for more types of legal investment, and of the period of relative prosperity
generally thought to be in the offing, the extension that has been made cannot
be considered radical. Had the legislature openly debated the desirability
and possibility of conserving purchasing power in an inflationary period,
artificial or otherwise, they might have deemed it not too radical to allow
investment in stocks conforming to stringent standards. 68 Additional diversification could thus have been facilitated. The refusal to make such an
extension would not, however, be surprising even had it been considered.
While there has been this extension into utility bonds, government securities, if not extended, have been re-defined. Under the new law they include
any obligations for the payment of interest and principal on which the faith
and credit of the United States, the Commonwealth, or its political subdivisions are pledged.6 9 Various "New Deal" obligations are thereby included, notably mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration and debentures of the FHA. Separate subsections specifically including
FHA obligations 70 would, therefore, appear superfluous, as the sponsors of
the bill recognized.71 As to the advisability of including government securities in the portfolios of fiduciaries, there is practically no dissent among
experts, notwithstanding threats of artificial inflation and increasingly unbalanced budgets. 72 One defect in this section of the new law, however, lies in
the specific provision for the housing obligations, in that it may have the
effect of leading the courts to interpret the more general provisions very narrowly. Too often is the legislative intent thus misconstrued. If government
obligations remain as sound as in the past, however, this undesired result
will in all probability not materialize.
Real securities have been definitely restricted by the new law. 73 Only
"improved real estate" may now be security for investments. There was a
further proposal to exclude all "single purpose properties", 74 but the legislature finally determined that only theaters and manufacturing premises
should, like unimproved real estate, be taboo. Yet the law apparently provides a loophole whereby theaters and factories may be security for legal
investments, for the restriction can be found only in Subsection 6 of the law
which provides that investment may be made in real estate bonds, "secured
by improved real estate . . . not . . . used as a theatre or for manufacturing purposes." Another subsection which provides that the fiduciary may
68. Apparently the legislature gave little thought to such a possibility, or, in fact, to the
possibility of any changes in the bill as introduced. The Legislative Journal discloses no
discussion on the floors of either the Senate or the House, although the committees must
have given the bill serious consideration. The only amendment of importance to be proposed,
however, was that referred to infra note 74. For a history of the bill, see HISTORY OF
HousE BLLS AND RESOLUTIONS (1935) 50.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 8oi (2-3).
70. Id., II, 12.
71. TRUST INVESTMENTS IN PA. (1935) 32-33.
72. Nor is the yield on government securities substantially lower than that on other forms
of high grade bonds. (1935) 6o TRUST COMPANIES 170.
73. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 8oi (4-6).
74. An amendment proposing to exclude also garages, stables, dance halls, houses of
JOURNAL 4465,
amusement, and houses of worship, was struck out. (1935) i8 LmnsLAr
4466.
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invest in first mortgages, securing bonds or other obligations, limits them
only to "improved real estate . . . situated within this Commonwealth".

Evasion of the legislative purpose through participations 75 in mortgages on
the forbidden realty will, therefore, be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent.
Another new limitation is on ground rents. These must now, when capitalized at five per cent, total no more than two-thirds of the fair value of the
property, although prior to the new law, the two-thirds limitation was imposed only on mortgages and real estate bonds. While in general real securities are subject to criticism because of the recent history of real estate and
because of the inherent difficulties of liquidation, the new restrictions imposed by the Fiduciaries Act should provide the necessary safety.
The new section entitled "Fractional Interests" in effect allows investment in any portion of any whole investment legalized by the Act.7 6 In it
may be found several changes from the earlier provisions on participations.
The most striking is the omission of the earlier prohibition against holders
of deeds of trust for which real estate bonds are issued relieving themselves
of their ordinary duties as trustees by contracting to that effect with purchasers of the bonds. This practice, which has been the subject of severe
criticism in this REVIEW, 7 7 is once more legalized by the omission, doubtless
deliberate though not even referred to by the sponsors. The new Act also
dispenses with the necessity for a trust certificate-the bankers appeared particularly anxious for this change, 78 which can seem to have no advantage
other than savings in the expense of printing and duplicating the certificates.
And yet the advantage of a trust certificate, in that its issue is strong evidence
of a definite appropriation to the trust, would seem far to outweigh the
expense entailed. Serious attention should be given to restoring the earlier
requirements.
The severest criticism of the new Act is not, however, related to the
types of investment made legal,7 9 nor even to omissions referred to, but to
two features of the Act which are, paradoxically, at once too stem and too
lenient with the fiduciary. The first is that the qualifying requirements of
the utility bonds newly admitted are so technical that the ordinary fiduciary,
especially the private fiduciary, will be unable personally to make safe selections. To invest in railroad bonds, for example, the fiduciary must determine, inter alia,whether the railroad is not a street railroad, what its domestic
mileage is, its operating revenue, its voting stock, its total stock outstanding
and fully paid, the ratio between its fixed and its remaining obligations, the
population of some of the municipalities through which the railroad runs, and
whether there have been defaults within the past six years.8 0 And not only
75. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
the new provision on participations.
76. Ibid.

1935) tit. 20, § 8O (7), entitled

"Fractional Interests" is

77. Gouley, Real Estate Mortgage Bonds as Trust Investments (1935)
REV. 953, 96o et seq.
78. TRUST INVESTMENTS IN PA. (1935)

83 U. OF PA. L.

22-23.

79. As to the advantages and disadvantages of real estate bonds, see Gouley, supra

note 77.
8o. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 8oi (8).

"Shortcomings of some of these

tests, such as those relating to minimum mileage, gross income, percentage of dividends over
a stated period, and the ratio of the mortgage to the underlying property" have been pointed
out, and other criteria for soundness suggested. (1935) 6o TRUST COMPANIES 172.
The Committee on Trust Investments of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association reported
to the banks and trust companies in the state in 1934: "Those to whom this pamphlet is
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is such an investigation necessary upon making the investment, but, since an
investment which ceases to fulfill the requirements must be discontinued,,"
constant study is necessary. To be sure, the fiduciary could seek the advice
of an expert, but that would be no defense in itself.82 The hardship on the
corporate fiduciary, however, is not so great, for he is better equipped to determine these technical matters, and one investigation will suffice him for all
of the numerous trusts he administers. While this might be the very basis
for arguing that corporate fiduciaries should be preferred in appointment and
that the special hardship on the individual fiduciary should therefore not be
considered, there are, doubtless, occasions where a private person can because
of his intimacy with the settlor and the beneficiaries better serve them.
In New York, the situation is ameliorated by the publication of a list of
named securities thought to fall within the qualifications of the statute.83
Since both the private and corporate fiduciary would benefit, the General
Assembly should act promptly to direct the Secretary of Banking to prepare
a similar list for Pennsylvania. The economies that would result from
having his department determine for all fiduciaries within the state what
investments are legal, although private study would still be necessary, would
manifestly be great, for the fiduciary's search would be limited. The legislature should also consider the novel proposition that investments made in
securities enumerated in the published list 84 should not be surchargeable.
Such tenderness for fiduciaries, however, should be accompanied by the
imposition of strict duties of watchfulness and diversification.
The leniency in the law lies in its opening words: ".

.

. a fiduciary

. may invest in" the obligations that follow.8 5 The dogma has it that
a statute reading "shall" or "must" is mandatory and exclusive, and that the
fiduciary will be surcharged for any investment outside the statute, whereas
a statute reading "may" invest is permissive, and the fiduciary may be cred.
ited even for investments outside the statute.8 6 The cases involving earlier
Pennsylvania legislation on the subject are confusing,81 which is the explana-

tion for the discord of writers. Some classify Pennsylvania according to
the dogma, but one writer thought that Hemphill's Appeal 88 had settled the
addressed are requested to read this bill sympathetically with an appreciative understanding
of the object to be attained [strengthening of the administration of trusts in the state]. The
proposed legislation may seem to be complicated, but this is a technical subject in which it is
not possible to prescribe proper tests in few words." Even corporate fiduciaries were expected to object to the technical study necessitated.
SL PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 20, § 8o, i3c.
82. Supra p. 643.
83. Such a list is periodically published by the State Superintendent of Banks of New
York. See e. g. ('934) 59 TRusT COMPANims 657-658. The bankers had originally planned
a companion bill to the new Fiduciaries Act. This bill was to require the Banking Department to promulgate a legal list, but was "temporarily dropped" because "the passage of that
bill would have involved an extra burden upon the office of the Secretary of Banking."
(1935) 61 TRUST COmPANIFS 631.
84. See Woodruff, supra note 22, 413 et seq., for a suggestion that investments be controlled by a commission.
85. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) tit. 2o, § 8oi.
86. 3 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note i8, § 614. See also Gibson's Estate, 312 Pa. 359, 362,
167 Atl. 282, 283 (1933) (decision expressly on ground that no loss had been sustained).
87. Whitaker, supra note 41, 474-478.
88. I8 Pa. 303 (1852).
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problem and that "may" had finally come to mean "must" in Pennsylvania. 9
Yet the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia recently held that the constitutional provision of 1873 did not prohibit the court from authorizing investment in corporate stocks, 90 although a federal court had interpreted the
Pennsylvania Constitution as an absolute prohibition of any transaction in
stocks by fiduciaries. 9 1 The confusion has continued, and the retention of
the old form of words is, therefore, unfortunate. Not too bold is the view
that the explanation lies in the fiduciaries' desire for another loophole through
which surcharge may be evaded. While a permissive statute would seem to
be of little value, the legislature ought at least to have expressly provided
either that it was to be permissive or that it was to be mandatory. This
ambiguity should be promptly remedied.
Conclusion
While the new law does indeed impose salutary limitations on investments that may be made for beneficiaries, it reflects to a large extent, like the
laws of other jurisdictions, the natural inclination of fiduciaries, particularly
92
of trust companies, to seek legislation that will primarily favor them.
Indirectly, of course, lenity with the fiduciaries may result in profit to the
beneficiaries, since it will enable the fiduciary to offer his services at lower
rates. But this can, of course, be carried too far, and beneficiaries should be
protected by the imposition of higher legal standards on fiduciaries.
Nor should legislation which involves such a great stake be hastily considered by the legislators. The people, and consequently the government,
have a deep interest in the billions held by fiduciaries in Pennsylvania. The
legislature has been given constitutional power to protect this interest. Impending summer-time is no excuse for hurried exercise of this power which
results in technical errors, unexplained changes, and unforeseen preferences.9 3 It is to be hoped that the legislature, spurred by a keener, public
interest, will study the possibilities of clarifying the existing law as to investments, raising investment standards, and reducing to a minimum technical
errors which may result in serious injury to both large and small interests
which combine to form a vast proportion of the assets in the state.
E.I.C.
89. Whitaker, supra note 41, 478. Yet 3 BoGnET, op. cit supra note 18, § 614, cites later
Pennsylvania cases for the opposite proposition. Darlington's Estate, 245 Pa. 212, 91 Atl.
486 (1914), is often incorrectly cited. The trustee's attorney had stolen non-legal securities
in which the trustee had invested without authority. The trustee not having been negligent
in his control of the securities, he was not surcharged. The case can stand only for the rule
that where the loss does not occur from default or depreciation in the investment, there is no
surcharge.
go. Reibel's Estate, 23 D. & C. 3o7 (1935).
91. Bagnell v. Ives, 184 Fed. 466 (C. C. M. D. Pa. 1911).
92. 19 REP. OF STATE BAR Ass'xOF WIS. (1929) 18.
93. The Fiduciaries Act is not the only instance of legislation jammed through the last
session. See Note (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 84.

